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T HE most significant decision handed down during the past year which
affects the law of evidence is not based on Texas law, yet it will have an
impact on two aspects of the Texas practice. Texas cases decided last year
concerning the vicarious admissions exception to the hearsay rule, as well
as the problem of the existence and sufficiency of the evidence on appeal
are also of importance.
I. CHAMBERS V. MISSISSIPPI
In Chambers v. Mississippi1 the United States Supreme Court decided two
points which will directly affect the Texas law of evidence. Chambers was
convicted of the murder of a policeman during a commotion brought about
by the attempted 'arrest of another person. Chambers, himself wounded by
the dying officer, was taken to a hospital by friends, where he was placed
under guard and charged with the murder. Some time later, Gable McDon-
ald, one of the friends who took Chambers to the hospital, gave a sworn
confession to Chambers' attorneys that he, McDonald, had shot the officer.
He stated that he had used his own pistol, which he had discarded shortly
after the shooting, and also that he had told another friend that he shot
the officer. The confession was turned over to the police and McDonald
was placed in jail. One month later, at a preliminary hearing, McDonald
repudiated the confession, whereupon a local justice of the peace accepted
the repudiation and released him from custody.
When Chambers went to trial he endeavored to develop two lines of de-
fense. First, he attempted to show that he did not shoot the police officer.
Only one witness testified that he actually saw Chambers fire the shots, but
no weapon was recovered from the scene, and there was no proof
that Chambers had ever owned a .22 caliber pistol as was allegedly used
by the murderer. Furthermore, one eyewitness testified that he was looking
at Chambers and was sure that he did not fire the shots. Secondly, Cham-
bers attempted to show that McDonald had fired the fatal shots. In support
of this defense one witness testified that he had seen McDonald shoot the
officer, and a second witness testified that he saw McDonald immediately
* B.A., LL.B., University of Texas. Fulbright, Crooker and Jaworski Professor
of Law, University of Texas at Austin; Visiting Professor of Law, The Judge Advocate
General's School, United States Army. The author wishes to acknowledge the assist-
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1. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
EVIDENCE
after the shooting with a pistol in his hand. In addition, Chambers
attempted to prove that McDonald -had admitted the murder on four occa-
sions: once when he gave the sworn statement, and three other times prior
to that occasion in private conversations with friends.
Before the trial Chambers requested that the court order McDonald to
appear, and sought a ruling that if the state chose not to call McDonald,
he be allowed to call him as an adverse witness. The trial court did re-
quire McDonald to appear, but reserved ruling on the adverse witness mo-
tion. Because the state did not call McDonald as a witness, Chambers put
him on the stand, introduced his prior confession, and had it read to the
jury. The state, upon cross-examination, developed the fact that the con-
fession had been repudiated, and also elicited testimony from McDonald giv-
ing his present story. Chambers then renewed his motion to examine Mc-
Donald as an adverse witness, but the motion was denied. The trial court
stated: "He may be hostile, but he is not adverse in -the sense of the word,
so your request will be overruled."'2 Chambers then sought to introduce the
testimony of the three witnesses to whom McDonald had admitted the shoot-
ing, but hearsay objections to the testimony were sustained.
As the Supreme Court stated:
In sum, then, this was Chambers' predicament. As a consequence
of the combination of Mississippi's 'party witness' or 'voucher' rule and
its hearsay rule, he was unable either to cross-examine McDonald or
to present witnesses in his own behalf who would have discredited Mc-
Donald's repudiation and demonstrated his complicity.3
The Court first considered the "voucher" rule, which provides that a party
who calls a witness "vouches for his credibility," and may not impeach him.
As applied in the trial court, Chambers was not only precluded from cross-
examining McDonald, but was also restricted in the scope of his direct ex-
amination. Noting that the rule has been rejected altogether by the pro-
posed Federal Rules of Evidence, the Court stated:
Whatever validity the 'voucher' rule may have once enjoyed, and
apart from whatever usefulness it retains today in the civil trial process,
it bears little present relationship to the realities of the criminal process.
It might have been logical for the early common law to require a party
to vouch for the credibility of witnesses he brought 'before the jury to
affirm his veracity. Having selected them especially for that purpose,
the party might reasonably be expected to stand firmly behind their
testimony. But in modern criminal trials defendants are rarely able
to select their witnesses: they must take them where they find them.4
The Court did not rely exclusively upon this error for reversal, but also
considered -the hearsay question. Mississippi law recognizes the exception
2. Id. at 291. The Mississippi Supreme Court upheld this ruling, finding that
"McDonald's testimony was not adverse to appellant" because "[niowhere did he point
the finger at Chambers." Chambers v. Mississippi, 252 So. 2d 217, 220 (Miss. 1971).
3. 410 U.S. at 294.




to the hearsay rule for declarations against interest, but restricts that excep-
tion to declarations against pecuniary interest. 5 Recognizing that this is the
rule in most states, and is the present rule in federal practice, but that the
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 6 and a few states have rejected it, the
Court held that under the particular circumstances of the case before it, the
testimony should have been admitted.7  The Court then detailed four fac-
tors which led to admissibility. First, each of the confessions was
made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the murder. Sec-
ond, each one was corroborated by some other evidence in the case. Third,
each confession was in a real sense self-incriminatory and unquestionably
against interest. Finally, McDonald was present in the courtroom and un-
der oath so that he could have been cross-examined by the state and his
demeanor and responses weighed by the jury. In short, the testimony "bore
persuasive assurances of 'trustworthiness and thus was well within the basic
rationale of the exception for declarations against interest.",, The Court
concluded that "the exclusion of this critical evidence, coupled with the
State's refusal to permit Chambers to cross-examine McDonald, denied
him a trial in accord with traditional and fundamental standards of
due process."
Although the Court went on to say that in "reaching this judgment we
establish no new principles of constitutional law,"'1 the decision surely does
establish a new principle for the law of evidence. Much more important
than what -the Court did say in accepting the theory of declarations against
penal interest is what it did not say regarding another facet of the exception.
One of the standard requirements for the application of the declara-
tion against interest exception is that the declarant be unavailable."
However, nothing was said about this requirement, and in fact both the Mis-
sissippj' 2 and the federal' 8 precedents were distinguished on the ground that
in both cases the declarant was unavailable. Moreover, the Court found
the final factor establishing admissibility to be the presence of McDonald,
and his availability for cross-examination.1 4
5. H. MCELROY, MississipPi EVIDENCE § 46 (1955); Forrest County Cooperative
Ass'n v. McCaffrey, 176 So. 2d 287 (Miss. 1965).
6. Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 804(b)(4), 56 F.R.D. 183, 321
(1973).
7. The Court limited its holding by stating that "we need not decide in this case
whether, under other circumstances, it might serve some valid state purpose by exclud-
ing untrustworthy testimony." 410 U.S. at 300.
8. Id. at 302.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 280 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK].
12. Brown v. State, 99 Miss. 719, 55 So. 961 (1911).
13. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
14. In a footnote the Court stated:
McDonald's presence also deprives the State's argument for retention
of the penal-interest rule of much of its force. In claiming that '[t]o
change the rule would work a travesty of justice,' the State posited the
following hypothetical: 'If the rule were changed, A could be charged
with the crime; B could tell C and D that he committed the crime; B
could go into hiding and at A's trial C and D would testify as to B's ad-
mission of guilt; A could be acquitted and B would return to stand trial;
[Vol. 28
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The decision in Chambers and that in California v. Green'5 indicate that
the availability of the declarant for cross-examination at the trial is by far
the most important factor to be considered both in the application of excep-
tions to the hearsay rule and in satisfaction of the right of confrontation.
This result is fortified by the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence,' 6 though
diluted to some extent by congressional action.' 7 The classical requirement
of some special need for hearsay testimony is replaced by a satisfaction of
the purposes of the hearsay rule itself, namely the declarant's presence under
oath, subject to cross-examination, and the weighing of his demeanor and
responses by the trier of fact.
Whatever the possible impact on the hearsay rule in general, it is clear
that the decision will require a change in Texas practice, both with respect
to the impeachment by the accused of a witness called by him,'8 and the
use of declarations against penal interest,'9 whether the declarant is avail-
able or not.
II. VICAIuOUS ADMISSIONS
In Big Mack Trucking Co. v. Dickerson20 the Supreme Court of Texas
reversed a decision which was applauded in last year's Survey.21  Three
holdings of the court in Big Mack are important. While two of these strictly
concern the law of evidence, the third is intertwined with the substantive
law of torts. The first evidentiary holding denied the admissibility of
a statement made by an employee to his employer concerning the cause of
B could then provide several witnesses to testify as to his whereabouts at
the time of the crime. The testimony of those witnesses along with A's
statement that he really committed the crime would result in B's acquit-
tal. A would be barred from further prosecution because of the protec-
tion against double jeopardy. No one could be convicted of perjury as A
did not testify at his first trial, B did not lie under oath, and C and D
were truthful in their testimony.' . . . Obviously, 'B's' absence at trial is
critical to the success of the justice-subverting ploy.
410 U.S. at 301-02 n.21.
15. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
16. Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 801(d)(1), 56 F.R.D. 183, 293
(1973). A statement is not hearsay if:(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and
the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, or (B) consistent
with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge
against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C)
one of identification of a person made after perceiving him ....
Id. But cf. Vanston v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 482 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1973).
17. The House committee considering the rules added the following proviso to the
proposal: "Provided, That a prior inconsistent statement under clause (A) shall not
be admissible as proof of the facts stated unless it was given under oath and subject
to the penalty of perjury at a trial or hearing or in a deposition or before a grandjury." HOUSE COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 93D CONG., lST SESS., FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE, H.R. 5463 (Comm. Print 1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2077, 2104.
18. See 1 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 631-41 (1966)[hereinafter cited as MCCORMIcK & RAY]. See also Vanston v. Connecticut Gen. Life
Ins. Co., 482 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1973).
19. See Cameron v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 374, 217 S.W.2d 23 (1949); MCCoR-
MICK § 278; MCCORMICK & RAY §§ 1003, 1006.
20. 497 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. 1973).
21. Elliott, Evidence, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 158, 162 (1973).
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an accident. As noted last year, 22 the cases are divided on the issue, and
although it appears that the arguments favoring admissibility are persuasive,
the holding to the contrary comes as no surprise, only as a disappointment. 23
The second evidentiary holding denied the admissibility against an em-
ployer of an 'admission by his employee to a third party concerning the cause
of an accident. This result follows the weight of authority in the United
States that a truck driver is hired to drive, not to talk.24 The court stated:
"In terms of strictly consensual authority, we believe the well-advised em-
ployer would generally not authorize the driver to speak in these circum-
stances. '25 This is certainly true, but a well-advised employer would gen-
erally not authorize the driver to operate his vehicle in a negligent manner,
and the courts still impose liability on the employer if the driver, act-
ing within the general scope of his employment, negligently injures another.
It is suggested that the trend is toward admissibility in these circumstances
if the statement by the employee concerns a matter within the scope of his
employment.26 Again, the holding is not surprising, only disappointing.
The third point is another matter. Assuming the correctness of the other
two positions, statements by an employee to an employer or third parties
concerning the accident would not be admissible in a suit against the em-
ployer alone unless the employee was unavailable as a witness.27  In the
event, however, the employee were joined as a defendant, his state-
ments would be admissible against him as admissions of a party opponent.28
Assuming that the driver was acting within the scope of his employment,
the only issues to be submitted are those concerning the negligence of the
driver, proximate cause, and the extent of injuries. The employer is liable
because of -the doctrine of respondeat superior, not because of his own neg-
ligence. The court stated:
The suggestion is that with respect to proof of the servant's liability,
which we deem an essential element of plaintiff's case against the mas-
ter, the master loses the protection of the hearsay rule. Any reason
which suggests that the master should lose the protection of that rule
would also militate against the master's right to offer contrary evidence,
to cross-examine plaintiff's witnesses, to object to evidence on grounds
other than hearsay, or, indeed, even to plead the general denial which
requires the plaintiffs to prove the servant's liability in the first place.29
This position is simply not persuasive. If the courts are willing to hold
22. Id. at 162.
23. See McCORMICK § 267, at 642-43.
24. See id. at 641.
25. 497 S.W.2d at 288.
26. See MCCORMICK § 267, at 641; UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(9) (a); Pro-
posed Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 801(d)(2), 56 F.R.D. 183, 293 (1973). For
variations in the vicarious admissions rule, see Bolin Oil Co. v. Staples, 496 S.W.2d
167 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973), error ref. n r.e.; Commercial Standard Ins.
Co. v. Barron, 495 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973); Missouri Pac. R.R. v.
Cross, 487 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972), error granted.
27. See McCORMICK §§ 276-80; MCCORMICK & RAY §§ 1001-11. This is the tra-
ditional application of the declaration against interest exception to the hearsay rule.
But cf. the decision in Chambers discussed above.
28. See MCCORMICK § 262; MCCORMICK & RAY § 1121.
29. 497 S.W.2d at 287.
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a principal liable for the negligent acts of his agent, it must be because pub-
lic policy demands that third persons be protected. Responsibility is im-
posed upon the principal despite the fact that he would never have author-
ized the negligent act of his agent. Because the principal has chosen to act
through the agent, the acts of the agent are imputed to the principal.
Of course the principal should be afforded all the protection the hearsay
rule would offer to the agent, but only this protection. If the evi-
dence would be inadmissible against the agent, then it would be inadmis-
sible against the principal. Once it has been established that the agent was
acting within the scope of his authority when he committed the allegedly
negligent act, the rights and duties of the agent and his principal would co-
exist on the issue of negligence. While the agent's admissions would be ad-
missible against the principal, the principal would be entitled to all
the agent's rights to cross-examine witnesses, to object to evidence on other
grounds, and to offer evidence and enter pleas. Dead straw men do little
to strengthen arguments.
All the parties to the case, and all the courts which have considered the
case, agree that the evidence is admissible to prove the negligence of the
driver. The findings by the jury that the actions of the driver were negli-
gent and a proximate cause of the injuries are therefore supported by evi-
dence, and the doctrine of respondeat superior should then operate to au-
thorize a judgment against the principal. "To hold otherwise would be to
make a mockery of the law, because it would mean that the agent had been
found guilty of actionable negligence, upon competent evidence, while act-
ing within the scope of his employment, yet his principal had escaped."
30
The doctrine of respondeat superior has, therefore, been rendered inopera-
tive in this instance. To paraphrase the closing comments in last year's dis-
cussion, 31 it is suggested that a re-examination of the Texas position on the
matter is even longer overdue.
III. "No EVIDENCE" REVISITED
Three courts of civil appeals have been faced with points of error attack-
ing negative responses by the jury ,to certain special issues. The problem
has been discussed at length in other forums,8 2 but the recurrent difficulty
it creates requires that the basic principles involved be reviewed briefly be-
fore examining the recent decisions.
When a complaint on appeal concerns (1) whether or not an issue
should have been submitted to the jury at all because there was no fact
question, or (2) whether or not a particular answer by the jury to a properly
submitted issue was supported by the evidence, the correct wording of the
30. Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61, 68 (10th Cir. 1958), quoted and followed
in Madron v. Thomson, 245 Ore. 513, 419 P.2d 611 (1966).
31. Elliott, supra note 21, at 164.
32. See In re King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951); 4 R. McDON-
ALD, TEXAS Civr, PRACTICE § 18.14 (Elliott rev. 1971); Calvert, "No Evidence" and
"Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error, 38 TEXAs L. REv. 361 (1960); Garwood, The
Question of Insufficient Evidence on Appeal, 30 TExAs L. REv. 803. (1952).
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complaint depends upon which party had the burden of producing evidence
or the burden of persuasion on the issue.
Assume first that an issue is submitted and answered in the affirmative.
If the complaint by the party who did not have the burden of producing
evidence is that the issue should not have been submitted at all because no
fact issue was raised, it should state there was no evidence -to raise the is-
sue. 8 If, however, the complaint by the party who did not have the bur-
den of persuasion 34 is that although there was evidence to justify submission
of the issue, there was not enough to justify an affirmative answer, the com-
plaint should be that there was insufficient evidence to support the answer
of the jury. 5
On the other hand, assume that an issue is submitted and answered in
the negative. If the complaint by the party who had the burdens of pro-
ducing evidence and persuasion is that the issue should not have been sub-
mitted at all because no fact issue was raised, it should be that the propo-
sition was established as a matter of law. If the complaint by the party
who had the burden of persuasion is that although there was a factual dis-
pute to justify submission of the issue, on the evidence the negative answer
was wrong, the complaint should be that the answer by the jury was against
the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. It must be emphasized
that the first complaint in each situation is that the issue should not have
been submitted at all because there was no fact question involved. The
second complaint in each situation is that the jury answer to a properly sub-
mitted issue is wrong. Of course, the complaints may be made separately
or in the alternative.
The specific problem in each of the three cases was a complaint by the
party with the burdens of producing evidence and persuasion concern-
ing negative answers by the jury. In United National Life Insurance Co.
v. Jackson"6 the points of error contended that there was no evidence to
support the jury's negative findings. Under the above analysis, these points
were incorrectly stated, since the prevailing party did not have the burden
of producing evidence. However, the court sustained them using the proper
terminology that "the answers of the jury. . . are contrary to the undisputed
evidence as a matter of law."'8 7 Again, in Deviney v. McLendon"8
the points of error contended that there was no evidence to support the jury's
negative findings. The court overruled the points, holding that there were
fact questions raised on the issues, and that they were properly submitted.
It recognized, however, that "[t]he negative answers of the jury to the sev-
eral negligence issues amounted to nothing more than a failure or refusal
by the jury to find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
33. MCCORMICK & RAY §§ 43-46.
34. The two burdens are usually on the same party, but not necessarily so. See
Calvert, supra note 32, at 365.
35. Id. at 362.
36. 488 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972).
37. Id. at 836.
38. 496 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
[Vol. 28
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was negligent-meaning simply that the plaintiff had failed to discharge her
burden of proving such facts."'8 9 In a footnote the court added:
We do not necessarily subscribe to the views of one Court of Civil
Appeals when it held: 'In situations such as this where a jury returns
a negative answer to an issue upon which the proponent has the bur-
den of proof, the jury's negative answer need not be supported by affir-
mative evidence.' . . . We simply hold that the evidence presented
a question of fact for determination by the jury and that the plaintiff
failed to carry her burden of persuasion. 40
The third case, Prunty v. Post Oak Bank41 squarely considered the prin-
ciples set out above. First, the court held that "no-evidence" points of error
concerning negative findings are improper and do not invoke the authority
to review. "A jury's failure to find affirmatively on a special issue merely
means the party proponent failed to meet his burden of proving the fact
and evidence is not required to support the negative answer." 42  Second,
it considered the appellant's properly phrased complaint that the issue should
not have been submitted because the proposition was established as a mat-
ter of law, and found that negligence was not established as a matter of
law.43  Finally, it considered another properly phrased complaint 'that the
negative answers were contrary to the great weight and preponderance of
the evidence, and held that while a jury could properly have found negli-
gence, it could not say that a failure to so find was in disregard of the over-
whelming preponderance of the evidence. 44
Although the whole problem might seem like an exercise in semantics,
the cautious attorney should be very careful in phrasing his points of error
so that the appellate court will know exactly what the complaint on appeal
is. Failure to state the grounds of complaint properly may well lead to a
failure of review.
39. Id. at 164.
40. Id. at 165 n.1, quoting Smith v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 433 S.W.2d 217, 218-
19 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
41. 493 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
42. Id. at 646.
43. Id. at 647.
44. Id.
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